Chapter I
The State of Greece from the earliest Times to the Commencement
of the Peloponnesian War
Thucydides, an Athenian, wrote the history of the war between the
Peloponnesians and the Athenians, beginning at the moment that it broke
out, and believing that it would be a great war and more worthy of relation
than any that had preceded it. This belief was not without its grounds.
The preparations of both the combatants were in every department in the
last state of perfection; and he could see the rest of the Hellenic race
taking sides in the quarrel; those who delayed doing so at once having
it in contemplation. Indeed this was the greatest movement yet known in
history, not only of the Hellenes, but of a large part of the barbarian
world- I had almost said of mankind. For though the events of remote antiquity,
and even those that more immediately preceded the war, could not from lapse
of time be clearly ascertained, yet the evidences which an inquiry carried
as far back as was practicable leads me to trust, all point to the conclusion
that there was nothing on a great scale, either in war or in other
matters.
For instance, it is evident that the country now called Hellas
had in ancient times no settled population; on the contrary, migrations
were of frequent occurrence, the several tribes readily abandoning their
homes under the pressure of superior numbers. Without commerce, without
freedom of communication either by land or sea, cultivating no more of
their territory than the exigencies of life required, destitute of capital,
never planting their land (for they could not tell when an invader might
not come and take it all away, and when he did come they had no walls to
stop him), thinking that the necessities of daily sustenance could be supplied
at one place as well as another, they cared little for shifting their habitation,
and consequently neither built large cities nor attained to any other form
of greatness. The richest soils were always most subject to this change
of masters; such as the district now called Thessaly, Boeotia, most of
the Peloponnese, Arcadia excepted, and the most fertile parts of the rest
of Hellas. The goodness of the land favoured the aggrandizement of particular
individuals, and thus created faction which proved a fertile source of
ruin. It also invited invasion. Accordingly Attica, from the poverty of
its soil enjoying from a very remote period freedom from faction, never
changed its inhabitants. And here is no inconsiderable exemplification
of my assertion that the migrations were the cause of there being no correspondent
growth in other parts. The most powerful victims of war or faction from
the rest of Hellas took refuge with the Athenians as a safe retreat; and
at an early period, becoming naturalized, swelled the already large population
of the city to such a height that Attica became at last too small to hold
them, and they had to send out colonies to Ionia.
There is also another circumstance that contributes not a little
to my conviction of the weakness of ancient times. Before the Trojan war
there is no indication of any common action in Hellas, nor indeed of the
universal prevalence of the name; on the contrary, before the time of Hellen,
son of Deucalion, no such appellation existed, but the country went by
the names of the different tribes, in particular of the Pelasgian. It was
not till Hellen and his sons grew strong in Phthiotis, and were invited
as allies into the other cities, that one by one they gradually acquired
from the connection the name of Hellenes; though a long time elapsed before
that name could fasten itself upon all. The best proof of this is furnished
by Homer. Born long after the Trojan War, he nowhere calls all of them
by that name, nor indeed any of them except the followers of Achilles from
Phthiotis, who were the original Hellenes: in his poems they are called
Danaans, Argives, and Achaeans. He does not even use the term barbarian,
probably because the Hellenes had not yet been marked off from the rest
of the world by one distinctive appellation. It appears therefore that
the several Hellenic communities, comprising not only those who first acquired
the name, city by city, as they came to understand each other, but also
those who assumed it afterwards as the name of the whole people, were before
the Trojan war prevented by their want of strength and the absence of mutual
intercourse from displaying any collective action.
Indeed, they could not unite for this expedition till they had
gained increased familiarity with the sea. And the first person known to
us by tradition as having established a navy is Minos. He made himself
master of what is now called the Hellenic sea, and ruled over the Cyclades,
into most of which he sent the first colonies, expelling the Carians and
appointing his own sons governors; and thus did his best to put down piracy
in those waters, a necessary step to secure the revenues for his own
use.
For in early times the Hellenes and the barbarians of the coast
and islands, as communication by sea became more common, were tempted to
turn pirates, under the conduct of their most powerful men; the motives
being to serve their own cupidity and to support the needy. They would
fall upon a town unprotected by walls, and consisting of a mere collection
of villages, and would plunder it; indeed, this came to be the main source
of their livelihood, no disgrace being yet attached to such an achievement,
but even some glory. An illustration of this is furnished by the honour
with which some of the inhabitants of the continent still regard a successful
marauder, and by the question we find the old poets everywhere representing
the people as asking of voyagers- "Are they pirates?"- as if those who
are asked the question would have no idea of disclaiming the imputation,
or their interrogators of reproaching them for it. The same rapine prevailed
also by land.
And even at the present day many of Hellas still follow the old
fashion, the Ozolian Locrians for instance, the Aetolians, the Acarnanians,
and that region of the continent; and the custom of carrying arms is still
kept up among these continentals, from the old piratical habits. The whole
of Hellas used once to carry arms, their habitations being unprotected
and their communication with each other unsafe; indeed, to wear arms was
as much a part of everyday life with them as with the barbarians. And the
fact that the people in these parts of Hellas are still living in the old
way points to a time when the same mode of life was once equally common
to all. The Athenians were the first to lay aside their weapons, and to
adopt an easier and more luxurious mode of life; indeed, it is only lately
that their rich old men left off the luxury of wearing undergarments of
linen, and fastening a knot of their hair with a tie of golden grasshoppers,
a fashion which spread to their Ionian kindred and long prevailed among
the old men there. On the contrary, a modest style of dressing, more in
conformity with modern ideas, was first adopted by the Lacedaemonians,
the rich doing their best to assimilate their way of life to that of the
common people. They also set the example of contending naked, publicly
stripping and anointing themselves with oil in their gymnastic exercises.
Formerly, even in the Olympic contests, the athletes who contended wore
belts across their middles; and it is but a few years since that the practice
ceased. To this day among some of the barbarians, especially in Asia, when
prizes for boxing and wrestling are offered, belts are worn by the combatants.
And there are many other points in which a likeness might be shown between
the life of the Hellenic world of old and the barbarian of
to-day.
With respect to their towns, later on, at an era of increased facilities
of navigation and a greater supply of capital, we find the shores becoming
the site of walled towns, and the isthmuses being occupied for the purposes
of commerce and defence against a neighbour. But the old towns, on account
of the great prevalence of piracy, were built away from the sea, whether
on the islands or the continent, and still remain in their old sites. For
the pirates used to plunder one another, and indeed all coast populations,
whether seafaring or not.
The islanders, too, were great pirates. These islanders were Carians
and Phoenicians, by whom most of the islands were colonized, as was proved
by the following fact. During the purification of Delos by Athens in this
war all the graves in the island were taken up, and it was found that above
half their inmates were Carians: they were identified by the fashion of
the arms buried with them, and by the method of interment, which was the
same as the Carians still follow. But as soon as Minos had formed his navy,
communication by sea became easier, as he colonized most of the islands,
and thus expelled the malefactors. The coast population now began to apply
themselves more closely to the acquisition of wealth, and their life became
more settled; some even began to build themselves walls on the strength
of their newly acquired riches. For the love of gain would reconcile the
weaker to the dominion of the stronger, and the possession of capital enabled
the more powerful to reduce the smaller towns to subjection. And it was
at a somewhat later stage of this development that they went on the expedition
against Troy.
What enabled Agamemnon to raise the armament was more, in my opinion,
his superiority in strength, than the oaths of Tyndareus, which bound the
suitors to follow him. Indeed, the account given by those Peloponnesians
who have been the recipients of the most credible tradition is this. First
of all Pelops, arriving among a needy population from Asia with vast wealth,
acquired such power that, stranger though he was, the country was called
after him; and this power fortune saw fit materially to increase in the
hands of his descendants. Eurystheus had been killed in Attica by the Heraclids.
Atreus was his mother's brother; and to the hands of his relation, who
had left his father on account of the death of Chrysippus, Eurystheus,
when he set out on his expedition, had committed Mycenae and the government.
As time went on and Eurystheus did not return, Atreus complied with the
wishes of the Mycenaeans, who were influenced by fear of the Heraclids-
besides, his power seemed considerable, and he had not neglected to court
the favour of the populace- and assumed the sceptre of Mycenae and the
rest of the dominions of Eurystheus. And so the power of the descendants
of Pelops came to be greater than that of the descendants of Perseus. To
all this Agamemnon succeeded. He had also a navy far stronger than his
contemporaries, so that, in my opinion, fear was quite as strong an element
as love in the formation of the confederate expedition. The strength of
his navy is shown by the fact that his own was the largest contingent,
and that of the Arcadians was furnished by him; this at least is what Homer
says, if his testimony is deemed sufficient. Besides, in his account of
the transmission of the sceptre, he calls him "Of many an isle, and of
all Argos king." Now Agamemnon's was a continental power; and he could
not have been master of any except the adjacent islands (and these would
not be many), but through the possession of a fleet.
And from this expedition we may infer the character of earlier
enterprises. Now Mycenae may have been a small place, and many of the towns
of that age may appear comparatively insignificant, but no exact observer
would therefore feel justified in rejecting the estimate given by the poets
and by tradition of the magnitude of the armament. For I suppose if Lacedaemon
were to become desolate, and the temples and the foundations of the public
buildings were left, that as time went on there would be a strong disposition
with posterity to refuse to accept her fame as a true exponent of her power.
And yet they occupy two-fifths of Peloponnese and lead the whole, not to
speak of their numerous allies without. Still, as the city is neither built
in a compact form nor adorned with magnificent temples and public edifices,
but composed of villages after the old fashion of Hellas, there would be
an impression of inadequacy. Whereas, if Athens were to suffer the same
misfortune, I suppose that any inference from the appearance presented
to the eye would make her power to have been twice as great as it is. We
have therefore no right to be sceptical, nor to content ourselves with
an inspection of a town to the exclusion of a consideration of its power;
but we may safely conclude that the armament in question surpassed all
before it, as it fell short of modern efforts; if we can here also accept
the testimony of Homer's poems, in which, without allowing for the exaggeration
which a poet would feel himself licensed to employ, we can see that it
was far from equalling ours. He has represented it as consisting of twelve
hundred vessels; the Boeotian complement of each ship being a hundred and
twenty men, that of the ships of Philoctetes fifty. By this, I conceive,
he meant to convey the maximum and the minimum complement: at any rate,
he does not specify the amount of any others in his catalogue of the ships.
That they were all rowers as well as warriors we see from his account of
the ships of Philoctetes, in which all the men at the oar are bowmen. Now
it is improbable that many supernumeraries sailed, if we except the kings
and high officers; especially as they had to cross the open sea with munitions
of war, in ships, moreover, that had no decks, but were equipped in the
old piratical fashion. So that if we strike the average of the largest
and smallest ships, the number of those who sailed will appear inconsiderable,
representing, as they did, the whole force of Hellas. And this was due
not so much to scarcity of men as of money. Difficulty of subsistence made
the invaders reduce the numbers of the army to a point at which it might
live on the country during the prosecution of the war. Even after the victory
they obtained on their arrival- and a victory there must have been, or
the fortifications of the naval camp could never have been built- there
is no indication of their whole force having been employed; on the contrary,
they seem to have turned to cultivation of the Chersonese and to piracy
from want of supplies. This was what really enabled the Trojans to keep
the field for ten years against them; the dispersion of the enemy making
them always a match for the detachment left behind. If they had brought
plenty of supplies with them, and had persevered in the war without scattering
for piracy and agriculture, they would have easily defeated the Trojans
in the field, since they could hold their own against them with the division
on service. In short, if they had stuck to the siege, the capture of Troy
would have cost them less time and less trouble. But as want of money proved
the weakness of earlier expeditions, so from the same cause even the one
in question, more famous than its predecessors, may be pronounced on the
evidence of what it effected to have been inferior to its renown and to
the current opinion about it formed under the tuition of the
poets.
Even after the Trojan War, Hellas was still engaged in removing
and settling, and thus could not attain to the quiet which must precede
growth. The late return of the Hellenes from Ilium caused many revolutions,
and factions ensued almost everywhere; and it was the citizens thus driven
into exile who founded the cities. Sixty years after the capture of Ilium,
the modern Boeotians were driven out of Arne by the Thessalians, and settled
in the present Boeotia, the former Cadmeis; though there was a division
of them there before, some of whom joined the expedition to Ilium. Twenty
years later, the Dorians and the Heraclids became masters of Peloponnese;
so that much had to be done and many years had to elapse before Hellas
could attain to a durable tranquillity undisturbed by removals, and could
begin to send out colonies, as Athens did to Ionia and most of the islands,
and the Peloponnesians to most of Italy and Sicily and some places in the
rest of Hellas. All these places were founded subsequently to the war with
Troy.
But as the power of Hellas grew, and the acquisition of wealth
became more an object, the revenues of the states increasing, tyrannies
were by their means established almost everywhere- the old form of government
being hereditary monarchy with definite prerogatives- and Hellas began
to fit out fleets and apply herself more closely to the sea. It is said
that the Corinthians were the first to approach the modern style of naval
architecture, and that Corinth was the first place in Hellas where galleys
were built; and we have Ameinocles, a Corinthian shipwright, making four
ships for the Samians. Dating from the end of this war, it is nearly three
hundred years ago that Ameinocles went to Samos. Again, the earliest sea-fight
in history was between the Corinthians and Corcyraeans; this was about
two hundred and sixty years ago, dating from the same time. Planted on
an isthmus, Corinth had from time out of mind been a commercial emporium;
as formerly almost all communication between the Hellenes within and without
Peloponnese was carried on overland, and the Corinthian territory was the
highway through which it travelled. She had consequently great money resources,
as is shown by the epithet "wealthy" bestowed by the old poets on the place,
and this enabled her, when traffic by sea became more common, to procure
her navy and put down piracy; and as she could offer a mart for both branches
of the trade, she acquired for herself all the power which a large revenue
affords. Subsequently the Ionians attained to great naval strength in the
reign of Cyrus, the first king of the Persians, and of his son Cambyses,
and while they were at war with the former commanded for a while the Ionian
sea. Polycrates also, the tyrant of Samos, had a powerful navy in the reign
of Cambyses, with which he reduced many of the islands, and among them
Rhenea, which he consecrated to the Delian Apollo. About this time also
the Phocaeans, while they were founding Marseilles, defeated the Carthaginians
in a sea-fight. These were the most powerful navies. And even these, although
so many generations had elapsed since the Trojan war, seem to have been
principally composed of the old fifty-oars and long-boats, and to have
counted few galleys among their ranks. Indeed it was only shortly the Persian
war, and the death of Darius the successor of Cambyses, that the Sicilian
tyrants and the Corcyraeans acquired any large number of galleys. For after
these there were no navies of any account in Hellas till the expedition
of Xerxes; Aegina, Athens, and others may have possessed a few vessels,
but they were principally fifty-oars. It was quite at the end of this period
that the war with Aegina and the prospect of the barbarian invasion enabled
Themistocles to persuade the Athenians to build the fleet with which they
fought at Salamis; and even these vessels had not complete
decks.
The navies, then, of the Hellenes during the period we have traversed
were what I have described. All their insignificance did not prevent their
being an element of the greatest power to those who cultivated them, alike
in revenue and in dominion. They were the means by which the islands were
reached and reduced, those of the smallest area falling the easiest prey.
Wars by land there were none, none at least by which power was acquired;
we have the usual border contests, but of distant expeditions with conquest
for object we hear nothing among the Hellenes. There was no union of subject
cities round a great state, no spontaneous combination of equals for confederate
expeditions; what fighting there was consisted merely of local warfare
between rival neighbours. The nearest approach to a coalition took place
in the old war between Chalcis and Eretria; this was a quarrel in which
the rest of the Hellenic name did to some extent take
sides.
Various, too, were the obstacles which the national growth encountered
in various localities. The power of the Ionians was advancing with rapid
strides, when it came into collision with Persia, under King Cyrus, who,
after having dethroned Croesus and overrun everything between the Halys
and the sea, stopped not till he had reduced the cities of the coast; the
islands being only left to be subdued by Darius and the Phoenician
navy.
Again, wherever there were tyrants, their habit of providing simply
for themselves, of looking solely to their personal comfort and family
aggrandizement, made safety the great aim of their policy, and prevented
anything great proceeding from them; though they would each have their
affairs with their immediate neighbours. All this is only true of the mother
country, for in Sicily they attained to very great power. Thus for a long
time everywhere in Hellas do we find causes which make the states alike
incapable of combination for great and national ends, or of any vigorous
action of their own.
But at last a time came when the tyrants of Athens and the far
older tyrannies of the rest of Hellas were, with the exception of those
in Sicily, once and for all put down by Lacedaemon; for this city, though
after the settlement of the Dorians, its present inhabitants, it suffered
from factions for an unparalleled length of time, still at a very early
period obtained good laws, and enjoyed a freedom from tyrants which was
unbroken; it has possessed the same form of government for more than four
hundred years, reckoning to the end of the late war, and has thus been
in a position to arrange the affairs of the other states. Not many years
after the deposition of the tyrants, the battle of Marathon was fought
between the Medes and the Athenians. Ten years afterwards, the barbarian
returned with the armada for the subjugation of Hellas. In the face of
this great danger, the command of the confederate Hellenes was assumed
by the Lacedaemonians in virtue of their superior power; and the Athenians,
having made up their minds to abandon their city, broke up their homes,
threw themselves into their ships, and became a naval people. This coalition,
after repulsing the barbarian, soon afterwards split into two sections,
which included the Hellenes who had revolted from the King, as well as
those who had aided him in the war. At the end of the one stood Athens,
at the head of the other Lacedaemon, one the first naval, the other the
first military power in Hellas. For a short time the league held together,
till the Lacedaemonians and Athenians quarrelled and made war upon each
other with their allies, a duel into which all the Hellenes sooner or later
were drawn, though some might at first remain neutral. So that the whole
period from the Median war to this, with some peaceful intervals, was spent
by each power in war, either with its rival, or with its own revolted allies,
and consequently afforded them constant practice in military matters, and
that experience which is learnt in the school of danger.
The policy of Lacedaemon was not to exact tribute from her allies,
but merely to secure their subservience to her interests by establishing
oligarchies among them; Athens, on the contrary, had by degrees deprived
hers of their ships, and imposed instead contributions in money on all
except Chios and Lesbos. Both found their resources for this war separately
to exceed the sum of their strength when the alliance flourished
intact.
Having now given the result of my inquiries into early times, I
grant that there will be a difficulty in believing every particular detail.
The way that most men deal with traditions, even traditions of their own
country, is to receive them all alike as they are delivered, without applying
any critical test whatever. The general Athenian public fancy that Hipparchus
was tyrant when he fell by the hands of Harmodius and Aristogiton, not
knowing that Hippias, the eldest of the sons of Pisistratus, was really
supreme, and that Hipparchus and Thessalus were his brothers; and that
Harmodius and Aristogiton suspecting, on the very day, nay at the very
moment fixed on for the deed, that information had been conveyed to Hippias
by their accomplices, concluded that he had been warned, and did not attack
him, yet, not liking to be apprehended and risk their lives for nothing,
fell upon Hipparchus near the temple of the daughters of Leos, and slew
him as he was arranging the Panathenaic procession.
There are many other unfounded ideas current among the rest of
the Hellenes, even on matters of contemporary history, which have not been
obscured by time. For instance, there is the notion that the Lacedaemonian
kings have two votes each, the fact being that they have only one; and
that there is a company of Pitane, there being simply no such thing. So
little pains do the vulgar take in the investigation of truth, accepting
readily the first story that comes to hand. On the whole, however, the
conclusions I have drawn from the proofs quoted may, I believe, safely
be relied on. Assuredly they will not be disturbed either by the lays of
a poet displaying the exaggeration of his craft, or by the compositions
of the chroniclers that are attractive at truth's expense; the subjects
they treat of being out of the reach of evidence, and time having robbed
most of them of historical value by enthroning them in the region of legend.
Turning from these, we can rest satisfied with having proceeded upon the
clearest data, and having arrived at conclusions as exact as can be expected
in matters of such antiquity. To come to this war: despite the known disposition
of the actors in a struggle to overrate its importance, and when it is
over to return to their admiration of earlier events, yet an examination
of the facts will show that it was much greater than the wars which preceded
it.
With reference to the speeches in this history, some were delivered
before the war began, others while it was going on; some I heard myself,
others I got from various quarters; it was in all cases difficult to carry
them word for word in one's memory, so my habit has been to make the speakers
say what was in my opinion demanded of them by the various occasions, of
course adhering as closely as possible to the general sense of what they
really said. And with reference to the narrative of events, far from permitting
myself to derive it from the first source that came to hand, I did not
even trust my own impressions, but it rests partly on what I saw myself,
partly on what others saw for me, the accuracy of the report being always
tried by the most severe and detailed tests possible. My conclusions have
cost me some labour from the want of coincidence between accounts of the
same occurrences by different eye-witnesses, arising sometimes from imperfect
memory, sometimes from undue partiality for one side or the other. The
absence of romance in my history will, I fear, detract somewhat from its
interest; but if it be judged useful by those inquirers who desire an exact
knowledge of the past as an aid to the interpretation of the future, which
in the course of human things must resemble if it does not reflect it,
I shall be content. In fine, I have written my work, not as an essay which
is to win the applause of the moment, but as a possession for all
time.
The Median War, the greatest achievement of past times, yet found
a speedy decision in two actions by sea and two by land. The Peloponnesian
War was prolonged to an immense length, and, long as it was, it was short
without parallel for the misfortunes that it brought upon Hellas. Never
had so many cities been taken and laid desolate, here by the barbarians,
here by the parties contending (the old inhabitants being sometimes removed
to make room for others); never was there so much banishing and blood-shedding,
now on the field of battle, now in the strife of faction. Old stories of
occurrences handed down by tradition, but scantily confirmed by experience,
suddenly ceased to be incredible; there were earthquakes of unparalleled
extent and violence; eclipses of the sun occurred with a frequency unrecorded
in previous history; there were great droughts in sundry places and consequent
famines, and that most calamitous and awfully fatal visitation, the plague.
All this came upon them with the late war, which was begun by the Athenians
and Peloponnesians by the dissolution of the thirty years' truce made after
the conquest of Euboea. To the question why they broke the treaty, I answer
by placing first an account of their grounds of complaint and points of
difference, that no one may ever have to ask the immediate cause which
plunged the Hellenes into a war of such magnitude. The real cause I consider
to be the one which was formally most kept out of sight. The growth of
the power of Athens, and the alarm which this inspired in Lacedaemon, made
war inevitable. Still it is well to give the grounds alleged by either
side which led to the dissolution of the treaty and the breaking out of
the war.
Chapter II
Causes of the War - The Affair of Epidamnus - The Affair
of Potidaea
The city of Epidamnus stands on the right of the entrance of the
Ionic Gulf. Its vicinity is inhabited by the Taulantians, an Illyrian people.
The place is a colony from Corcyra, founded by Phalius, son of Eratocleides,
of the family of the Heraclids, who had according to ancient usage been
summoned for the purpose from Corinth, the mother country. The colonists
were joined by some Corinthians, and others of the Dorian race. Now, as
time went on, the city of Epidamnus became great and populous; but falling
a prey to factions arising, it is said, from a war with her neighbours
the barbarians, she became much enfeebled, and lost a considerable amount
of her power. The last act before the war was the expulsion of the nobles
by the people. The exiled party joined the barbarians, and proceeded to
plunder those in the city by sea and land; and the Epidamnians, finding
themselves hard pressed, sent ambassadors to Corcyra beseeching their mother
country not to allow them to perish, but to make up matters between them
and the exiles, and to rid them of the war with the barbarians. The ambassadors
seated themselves in the temple of Hera as suppliants, and made the above
requests to the Corcyraeans. But the Corcyraeans refused to accept their
supplication, and they were dismissed without having effected
anything.
When the Epidamnians found that no help could be expected from
Corcyra, they were in a strait what to do next. So they sent to Delphi
and inquired of the God whether they should deliver their city to the Corinthians
and endeavour to obtain some assistance from their founders. The answer
he gave them was to deliver the city and place themselves under Corinthian
protection. So the Epidamnians went to Corinth and delivered over the colony
in obedience to the commands of the oracle. They showed that their founder
came from Corinth, and revealed the answer of the god; and they begged
them not to allow them to perish, but to assist them. This the Corinthians
consented to do. Believing the colony to belong as much to themselves as
to the Corcyraeans, they felt it to be a kind of duty to undertake their
protection. Besides, they hated the Corcyraeans for their contempt of the
mother country. Instead of meeting with the usual honours accorded to the
parent city by every other colony at public assemblies, such as precedence
at sacrifices, Corinth found herself treated with contempt by a power which
in point of wealth could stand comparison with any even of the richest
communities in Hellas, which possessed great military strength, and which
sometimes could not repress a pride in the high naval position of an, island
whose nautical renown dated from the days of its old inhabitants, the Phaeacians.
This was one reason of the care that they lavished on their fleet, which
became very efficient; indeed they began the war with a force of a hundred
and twenty galleys.
All these grievances made Corinth eager to send the promised aid
to Epidamnus. Advertisement was made for volunteer settlers, and a force
of Ambraciots, Leucadians, and Corinthians was dispatched. They marched
by land to Apollonia, a Corinthian colony, the route by sea being avoided
from fear of Corcyraean interruption. When the Corcyraeans heard of the
arrival of the settlers and troops in Epidamnus, and the surrender of the
colony to Corinth, they took fire. Instantly putting to sea with five-and-twenty
ships, which were quickly followed by others, they insolently commanded
the Epidamnians to receive back the banished nobles- (it must be premised
that the Epidamnian exiles had come to Corcyra and, pointing to the sepulchres
of their ancestors, had appealed to their kindred to restore them)- and
to dismiss the Corinthian garrison and settlers. But to all this the Epidamnians
turned a deaf ear. Upon this the Corcyraeans commenced operations against
them with a fleet of forty sail. They took with them the exiles, with a
view to their restoration, and also secured the services of the Illyrians.
Sitting down before the city, they issued a proclamation to the effect
that any of the natives that chose, and the foreigners, might depart unharmed,
with the alternative of being treated as enemies. On their refusal the
Corcyraeans proceeded to besiege the city, which stands on an isthmus;
and the Corinthians, receiving intelligence of the investment of Epidamnus,
got together an armament and proclaimed a colony to Epidamnus, perfect
political equality being guaranteed to all who chose to go. Any who were
not prepared to sail at once might, by paying down the sum of fifty Corinthian
drachmae, have a share in the colony without leaving Corinth. Great numbers
took advantage of this proclamation, some being ready to start directly,
others paying the requisite forfeit. In case of their passage being disputed
by the Corcyraeans, several cities were asked to lend them a convoy. Megara
prepared to accompany them with eight ships, Pale in Cephallonia with four;
Epidaurus furnished five, Hermione one, Troezen two, Leucas ten, and Ambracia
eight. The Thebans and Phliasians were asked for money, the Eleans for
hulls as well; while Corinth herself furnished thirty ships and three thousand
heavy infantry.
When the Corcyraeans heard of their preparations they came to Corinth
with envoys from Lacedaemon and Sicyon, whom they persuaded to accompany
them, and bade her recall the garrison and settlers, as she had nothing
to do with Epidamnus. If, however, she had any claims to make, they were
willing to submit the matter to the arbitration of such of the cities in
Peloponnese as should be chosen by mutual agreement, and that the colony
should remain with the city to whom the arbitrators might assign it. They
were also willing to refer the matter to the oracle at Delphi. If, in defiance
of their protestations, war was appealed to, they should be themselves
compelled by this violence to seek friends in quarters where they had no
desire to seek them, and to make even old ties give way to the necessity
of assistance. The answer they got from Corinth was that, if they would
withdraw their fleet and the barbarians from Epidamnus, negotiation might
be possible; but, while the town was still being besieged, going before
arbitrators was out of the question. The Corcyraeans retorted that if Corinth
would withdraw her troops from Epidamnus they would withdraw theirs, or
they were ready to let both parties remain in statu quo, an armistice being
concluded till judgment could be given.
Turning a deaf ear to all these proposals, when their ships were
manned and their allies had come in, the Corinthians sent a herald before
them to declare war and, getting under way with seventy-five ships and
two thousand heavy infantry, sailed for Epidamnus to give battle to the
Corcyraeans. The fleet was under the command of Aristeus, son of Pellichas,
Callicrates, son of Callias, and Timanor, son of Timanthes; the troops
under that of Archetimus, son of Eurytimus, and Isarchidas, son of Isarchus.
When they had reached Actium in the territory of Anactorium, at the mouth
of the mouth of the Gulf of Ambracia, where the temple of Apollo stands,
the Corcyraeans sent on a herald in a light boat to warn them not to sail
against them. Meanwhile they proceeded to man their ships, all of which
had been equipped for action, the old vessels being undergirded to make
them seaworthy. On the return of the herald without any peaceful answer
from the Corinthians, their ships being now manned, they put out to sea
to meet the enemy with a fleet of eighty sail (forty were engaged in the
siege of Epidamnus), formed line, and went into action, and gained a decisive
victory, and destroyed fifteen of the Corinthian vessels. The same day
had seen Epidamnus compelled by its besiegers to capitulate; the conditions
being that the foreigners should be sold, and the Corinthians kept as prisoners
of war, till their fate should be otherwise decided.
After the engagement the Corcyraeans set up a trophy on Leukimme,
a headland of Corcyra, and slew all their captives except the Corinthians,
whom they kept as prisoners of war. Defeated at sea, the Corinthians and
their allies repaired home, and left the Corcyraeans masters of all the
sea about those parts. Sailing to Leucas, a Corinthian colony, they ravaged
their territory, and burnt Cyllene, the harbour of the Eleans, because
they had furnished ships and money to Corinth. For almost the whole of
the period that followed the battle they remained masters of the sea, and
the allies of Corinth were harassed by Corcyraean cruisers. At last Corinth,
roused by the sufferings of her allies, sent out ships and troops in the
fall of the summer, who formed an encampment at Actium and about Chimerium,
in Thesprotis, for the protection of Leucas and the rest of the friendly
cities. The Corcyraeans on their part formed a similar station on Leukimme.
Neither party made any movement, but they remained confronting each other
till the end of the summer, and winter was at hand before either of them
returned home.
Corinth, exasperated by the war with the Corcyraeans, spent the
whole of the year after the engagement and that succeeding it in building
ships, and in straining every nerve to form an efficient fleet; rowers
being drawn from Peloponnese and the rest of Hellas by the inducement of
large bounties. The Corcyraeans, alarmed at the news of their preparations,
being without a single ally in Hellas (for they had not enrolled themselves
either in the Athenian or in the Lacedaemonian confederacy), decided to
repair to Athens in order to enter into alliance and to endeavour to procure
support from her. Corinth also, hearing of their intentions, sent an embassy
to Athens to prevent the Corcyraean navy being joined by the Athenian,
and her prospect of ordering the war according to her wishes being thus
impeded. An assembly was convoked, and the rival advocates appeared: the
Corcyraeans spoke as follows:
"Athenians! when a people that have not rendered any important
service or support to their neighbours in times past, for which they might
claim to be repaid, appear before them as we now appear before you to solicit
their assistance, they may fairly be required to satisfy certain preliminary
conditions. They should show, first, that it is expedient or at least safe
to grant their request; next, that they will retain a lasting sense of
the kindness. But if they cannot clearly establish any of these points,
they must not be annoyed if they meet with a rebuff. Now the Corcyraeans
believe that with their petition for assistance they can also give you
a satisfactory answer on these points, and they have therefore dispatched
us hither. It has so happened that our policy as regards you with respect
to this request, turns out to be inconsistent, and as regards our interests,
to be at the present crisis inexpedient. We say inconsistent, because a
power which has never in the whole of her past history been willing to
ally herself with any of her neighbours, is now found asking them to ally
themselves with her. And we say inexpedient, because in our present war
with Corinth it has left us in a position of entire isolation, and what
once seemed the wise precaution of refusing to involve ourselves in alliances
with other powers, lest we should also involve ourselves in risks of their
choosing, has now proved to be folly and weakness. It is true that in the
late naval engagement we drove back the Corinthians from our shores single-handed.
But they have now got together a still larger armament from Peloponnese
and the rest of Hellas; and we, seeing our utter inability to cope with
them without foreign aid, and the magnitude of the danger which subjection
to them implies, find it necessary to ask help from you and from every
other power. And we hope to be excused if we forswear our old principle
of complete political isolation, a principle which was not adopted with
any sinister intention, but was rather the consequence of an error in
judgment.
"Now there are many reasons why in the event of your compliance
you will congratulate yourselves on this request having been made to you.
First, because your assistance will be rendered to a power which, herself
inoffensive, is a victim to the injustice of others. Secondly, because
all that we most value is at stake in the present contest, and your welcome
of us under these circumstances will be a proof of goodwill which will
ever keep alive the gratitude you will lay up in our hearts. Thirdly, yourselves
excepted, we are the greatest naval power in Hellas. Moreover, can you
conceive a stroke of good fortune more rare in itself, or more disheartening
to your enemies, than that the power whose adhesion you would have valued
above much material and moral strength should present herself self-invited,
should deliver herself into your hands without danger and without expense,
and should lastly put you in the way of gaining a high character in the
eyes of the world, the gratitude of those whom you shall assist, and a
great accession of strength for yourselves? You may search all history
without finding many instances of a people gaining all these advantages
at once, or many instances of a power that comes in quest of assistance
being in a position to give to the people whose alliance she solicits as
much safety and honour as she will receive. But it will be urged that it
is only in the case of a war that we shall be found useful. To this we
answer that if any of you imagine that that war is far off, he is grievously
mistaken, and is blind to the fact that Lacedaemon regards you with jealousy
and desires war, and that Corinth is powerful there- the same, remember,
that is your enemy, and is even now trying to subdue us as a preliminary
to attacking you. And this she does to prevent our becoming united by a
common enmity, and her having us both on her hands, and also to ensure
getting the start of you in one of two ways, either by crippling our power
or by making its strength her own. Now it is our policy to be beforehand
with her- that is, for Corcyra to make an offer of alliance and for you
to accept it; in fact, we ought to form plans against her instead of waiting
to defeat the plans she forms against us.
"If she asserts that for you to receive a colony of hers into alliance
is not right, let her know that every colony that is well treated honours
its parent state, but becomes estranged from it by injustice. For colonists
are not sent forth on the understanding that they are to be the slaves
of those that remain behind, but that they are to be their equals. And
that Corinth was injuring us is clear. Invited to refer the dispute about
Epidamnus to arbitration, they chose to prosecute their complaints war
rather than by a fair trial. And let their conduct towards us who are their
kindred be a warning to you not to be misled by their deceit, nor to yield
to their direct requests; concessions to adversaries only end in self-reproach,
and the more strictly they are avoided the greater will be the chance of
security.
"If it be urged that your reception of us will be a breach of the
treaty existing between you and Lacedaemon, the answer is that we are a
neutral state, and that one of the express provisions of that treaty is
that it shall be competent for any Hellenic state that is neutral to join
whichever side it pleases. And it is intolerable for Corinth to be allowed
to obtain men for her navy not only from her allies, but also from the
rest of Hellas, no small number being furnished by your own subjects; while
we are to be excluded both from the alliance left open to us by treaty,
and from any assistance that we might get from other quarters, and you
are to be accused of political immorality if you comply with our request.
On the other hand, we shall have much greater cause to complain of you,
if you do not comply with it; if we, who are in peril and are no enemies
of yours, meet with a repulse at your hands, while Corinth, who is the
aggressor and your enemy, not only meets with no hindrance from you, but
is even allowed to draw material for war from your dependencies. This ought
not to be, but you should either forbid her enlisting men in your dominions,
or you should lend us too what help you may think advisable.
"But your real policy is to afford us avowed countenance and support.
The advantages of this course, as we premised in the beginning of our speech,
are many. We mention one that is perhaps the chief. Could there be a clearer
guarantee of our good faith than is offered by the fact that the power
which is at enmity with you is also at enmity with us, and that that power
is fully able to punish defection? And there is a wide difference between
declining the alliance of an inland and of a maritime power. For your first
endeavour should be to prevent, if possible, the existence of any naval
power except your own; failing this, to secure the friendship of the strongest
that does exist. And if any of you believe that what we urge is expedient,
but fear to act upon this belief, lest it should lead to a breach of the
treaty, you must remember that on the one hand, whatever your fears, your
strength will be formidable to your antagonists; on the other, whatever
the confidence you derive from refusing to receive us, your weakness will
have no terrors for a strong enemy. You must also remember that your decision
is for Athens no less than Corcyra, and that you are not making the best
provision for her interests, if at a time when you are anxiously scanning
the horizon that you may be in readiness for the breaking out of the war
which is all but upon you, you hesitate to attach to your side a place
whose adhesion or estrangement is alike pregnant with the most vital consequences.
For it lies conveniently for the coast- navigation in the direction of
Italy and Sicily, being able to bar the passage of naval reinforcements
from thence to Peloponnese, and from Peloponnese thither; and it is in
other respects a most desirable station. To sum up as shortly as possible,
embracing both general and particular considerations, let this show you
the folly of sacrificing us. Remember that there are but three considerable
naval powers in Hellas- Athens, Corcyra, and Corinth- and that if you allow
two of these three to become one, and Corinth to secure us for herself,
you will have to hold the sea against the united fleets of Corcyra and
Peloponnese. But if you receive us, you will have our ships to reinforce
you in the struggle."
Such were the words of the Corcyraeans. After they had finished,
the Corinthians spoke as follows:
"These Corcyraeans in the speech we have just heard do not confine
themselves to the question of their reception into your alliance. They
also talk of our being guilty of injustice, and their being the victims
of an unjustifiable war. It becomes necessary for us to touch upon both
these points before we proceed to the rest of what we have to say, that
you may have a more correct idea of the grounds of our claim, and have
good cause to reject their petition. According to them, their old policy
of refusing all offers of alliance was a policy of moderation. It was in
fact adopted for bad ends, not for good; indeed their conduct is such as
to make them by no means desirous of having allies present to witness it,
or of having the shame of asking their concurrence. Besides, their geographical
situation makes them independent of others, and consequently the decision
in cases where they injure any lies not with judges appointed by mutual
agreement, but with themselves, because, while they seldom make voyages
to their neighbours, they are constantly being visited by foreign vessels
which are compelled to put in to Corcyra. In short, the object that they
propose to themselves, in their specious policy of complete isolation,
is not to avoid sharing in the crimes of others, but to secure monopoly
of crime to themselves- the licence of outrage wherever they can compel,
of fraud wherever they can elude, and the enjoyment of their gains without
shame. And yet if they were the honest men they pretend to be, the less
hold that others had upon them, the stronger would be the light in which
they might have put their honesty by giving and taking what was
just.
"But such has not been their conduct either towards others or towards
us. The attitude of our colony towards us has always been one of estrangement
and is now one of hostility; for, say they: 'We were not sent out to be
ill-treated.' We rejoin that we did not found the colony to be insulted
by them, but to be their head and to be regarded with a proper respect.
At any rate our other colonies honour us, and we are much beloved by our
colonists; and clearly, if the majority are satisfied with us, these can
have no good reason for a dissatisfaction in which they stand alone, and
we are not acting improperly in making war against them, nor are we making
war against them without having received signal provocation. Besides, if
we were in the wrong, it would be honourable in them to give way to our
wishes, and disgraceful for us to trample on their moderation; but in the
pride and licence of wealth they have sinned again and again against us,
and never more deeply than when Epidamnus, our dependency, which they took
no steps to claim in its distress upon our coming to relieve it, was by
them seized, and is now held by force of arms.
"As to their allegation that they wished the question to be first
submitted to arbitration, it is obvious that a challenge coming from the
party who is safe in a commanding position cannot gain the credit due only
to him who, before appealing to arms, in deeds as well as words, places
himself on a level with his adversary. In their case, it was not before
they laid siege to the place, but after they at length understood that
we should not tamely suffer it, that they thought of the specious word
arbitration. And not satisfied with their own misconduct there, they appear
here now requiring you to join with them not in alliance but in crime,
and to receive them in spite of their being at enmity with us. But it was
when they stood firmest that they should have made overtures to you, and
not at a time when we have been wronged and they are in peril; nor yet
at a time when you will be admitting to a share in your protection those
who never admitted you to a share in their power, and will be incurring
an equal amount of blame from us with those in whose offences you had no
hand. No, they should have shared their power with you before they asked
you to share your fortunes with them.
"So then the reality of the grievances we come to complain of,
and the violence and rapacity of our opponents, have both been proved.
But that you cannot equitably receive them, this you have still to learn.
It may be true that one of the provisions of the treaty is that it shall
be competent for any state, whose name was not down on the list, to join
whichever side it pleases. But this agreement is not meant for those whose
object in joining is the injury of other powers, but for those whose need
of support does not arise from the fact of defection, and whose adhesion
will not bring to the power that is mad enough to receive them war instead
of peace; which will be the case with you, if you refuse to listen to us.
For you cannot become their auxiliary and remain our friend; if you join
in their attack, you must share the punishment which the defenders inflict
on them. And yet you have the best possible right to be neutral, or, failing
this, you should on the contrary join us against them. Corinth is at least
in treaty with you; with Corcyra you were never even in truce. But do not
lay down the principle that defection is to be patronized. Did we on the
defection of the Samians record our vote against you, when the rest of
the Peloponnesian powers were equally divided on the question whether they
should assist them? No, we told them to their face that every power has
a right to punish its own allies. Why, if you make it your policy to receive
and assist all offenders, you will find that just as many of your dependencies
will come over to us, and the principle that you establish will press less
heavily on us than on yourselves.
"This then is what Hellenic law entitles us to demand as a right.
But we have also advice to offer and claims on your gratitude, which, since
there is no danger of our injuring you, as we are not enemies, and since
our friendship does not amount to very frequent intercourse, we say ought
to be liquidated at the present juncture. When you were in want of ships
of war for the war against the Aeginetans, before the Persian invasion,
Corinth supplied you with twenty vessels. That good turn, and the line
we took on the Samian question, when we were the cause of the Peloponnesians
refusing to assist them, enabled you to conquer Aegina and to punish Samos.
And we acted thus at crises when, if ever, men are wont in their efforts
against their enemies to forget everything for the sake of victory, regarding
him who assists them then as a friend, even if thus far he has been a foe,
and him who opposes them then as a foe, even if he has thus far been a
friend; indeed they allow their real interests to suffer from their absorbing
preoccupation in the struggle.
"Weigh well these considerations, and let your youth learn what
they are from their elders, and let them determine to do unto us as we
have done unto you. And let them not acknowledge the justice of what we
say, but dispute its wisdom in the contingency of war. Not only is the
straightest path generally speaking the wisest; but the coming of the war,
which the Corcyraeans have used as a bugbear to persuade you to do wrong,
is still uncertain, and it is not worth while to be carried away by it
into gaining the instant and declared enmity of Corinth. It were, rather,
wise to try and counteract the unfavourable impression which your conduct
to Megara has created. For kindness opportunely shown has a greater power
of removing old grievances than the facts of the case may warrant. And
do not be seduced by the prospect of a great naval alliance. Abstinence
from all injustice to other first-rate powers is a greater tower of strength
than anything that can be gained by the sacrifice of permanent tranquillity
for an apparent temporary advantage. It is now our turn to benefit by the
principle that we laid down at Lacedaemon, that every power has a right
to punish her own allies. We now claim to receive the same from you, and
protest against your rewarding us for benefiting you by our vote by injuring
us by yours. On the contrary, return us like for like, remembering that
this is that very crisis in which he who lends aid is most a friend, and
he who opposes is most a foe. And for these Corcyraeans- neither receive
them into alliance in our despite, nor be their abettors in crime. So do,
and you will act as we have a right to expect of you, and at the same time
best consult your own interests."
Such were the words of the Corinthians.
When the Athenians had heard both out, two assemblies were held.
In the first there was a manifest disposition to listen to the representations
of Corinth; in the second, public feeling had changed and an alliance with
Corcyra was decided on, with certain reservations. It was to be a defensive,
not an offensive alliance. It did not involve a breach of the treaty with
Peloponnese: Athens could not be required to join Corcyra in any attack
upon Corinth. But each of the contracting parties had a right to the other's
assistance against invasion, whether of his own territory or that of an
ally. For it began now to be felt that the coming of the Peloponnesian
war was only a question of time, and no one was willing to see a naval
power of such magnitude as Corcyra sacrificed to Corinth; though if they
could let them weaken each other by mutual conflict, it would be no bad
preparation for the struggle which Athens might one day have to wage with
Corinth and the other naval powers. At the same time the island seemed
to lie conveniently on the coasting passage to Italy and Sicily. With these
views, Athens received Corcyra into alliance and, on the departure of the
Corinthians not long afterwards, sent ten ships to their assistance. They
were commanded by Lacedaemonius, the son of Cimon, Diotimus, the son of
Strombichus, and Proteas, the son of Epicles. Their instructions were to
avoid collision with the Corinthian fleet except under certain circumstances.
If it sailed to Corcyra and threatened a landing on her coast, or in any
of her possessions, they were to do their utmost to prevent it. These instructions
were prompted by an anxiety to avoid a breach of the
treaty.
Meanwhile the Corinthians completed their preparations, and sailed
for Corcyra with a hundred and fifty ships. Of these Elis furnished ten,
Megara twelve, Leucas ten, Ambracia twenty-seven, Anactorium one, and Corinth
herself ninety. Each of these contingents had its own admiral, the Corinthian
being under the command of Xenoclides, son of Euthycles, with four colleagues.
Sailing from Leucas, they made land at the part of the continent opposite
Corcyra. They anchored in the harbour of Chimerium, in the territory of
Thesprotis, above which, at some distance from the sea, lies the city of
Ephyre, in the Elean district. By this city the Acherusian lake pours its
waters into the sea. It gets its name from the river Acheron, which flows
through Thesprotis and falls into the lake. There also the river Thyamis
flows, forming the boundary between Thesprotis and Kestrine; and between
these rivers rises the point of Chimerium. In this part of the continent
the Corinthians now came to anchor, and formed an encampment. When the
Corcyraeans saw them coming, they manned a hundred and ten ships, commanded
by Meikiades, Aisimides, and Eurybatus, and stationed themselves at one
of the Sybota isles; the ten Athenian ships being present. On Point Leukimme
they posted their land forces, and a thousand heavy infantry who had come
from Zacynthus to their assistance. Nor were the Corinthians on the mainland
without their allies. The barbarians flocked in large numbers to their
assistance, the inhabitants of this part of the continent being old allies
of theirs.
When the Corinthian preparations were completed, they took three
days' provisions and put out from Chimerium by night, ready for action.
Sailing with the dawn, they sighted the Corcyraean fleet out at sea and
coming towards them. When they perceived each other, both sides formed
in order of battle. On the Corcyraean right wing lay the Athenian ships,
the rest of the line being occupied by their own vessels formed in three
squadrons, each of which was commanded by one of the three admirals. Such
was the Corcyraean formation. The Corinthian was as follows: on the right
wing lay the Megarian and Ambraciot ships, in the centre the rest of the
allies in order. But the left was composed of the best sailers in the Corinthian
navy, to encounter the Athenians and the right wing of the Corcyraeans.
As soon as the signals were raised on either side, they joined battle.
Both sides had a large number of heavy infantry on their decks, and a large
number of archers and darters, the old imperfect armament still prevailing.
The sea-fight was an obstinate one, though not remarkable for its science;
indeed it was more like a battle by land. Whenever they charged each other,
the multitude and crush of the vessels made it by no means easy to get
loose; besides, their hopes of victory lay principally in the heavy infantry
on the decks, who stood and fought in order, the ships remaining stationary.
The manoeuvre of breaking the line was not tried; in short, strength and
pluck had more share in the fight than science. Everywhere tumult reigned,
the battle being one scene of confusion; meanwhile the Athenian ships,
by coming up to the Corcyraeans whenever they were pressed, served to alarm
the enemy, though their commanders could not join in the battle from fear
of their instructions. The right wing of the Corinthians suffered most.
The Corcyraeans routed it, and chased them in disorder to the continent
with twenty ships, sailed up to their camp, and burnt the tents which they
found empty, and plundered the stuff. So in this quarter the Corinthians
and their allies were defeated, and the Corcyraeans were victorious. But
where the Corinthians themselves were, on the left, they gained a decided
success; the scanty forces of the Corcyraeans being further weakened by
the want of the twenty ships absent on the pursuit. Seeing the Corcyraeans
hard pressed, the Athenians began at length to assist them more unequivocally.
At first, it is true, they refrained from charging any ships; but when
the rout was becoming patent, and the Corinthians were pressing on, the
time at last came when every one set to, and all distinction was laid aside,
and it came to this point, that the Corinthians and Athenians raised their
hands against each other.
After the rout, the Corinthians, instead of employing themselves
in lashing fast and hauling after them the hulls of the vessels which they
had disabled, turned their attention to the men, whom they butchered as
they sailed through, not caring so much to make prisoners. Some even of
their own friends were slain by them, by mistake, in their ignorance of
the defeat of the right wing For the number of the ships on both sides,
and the distance to which they covered the sea, made it difficult, after
they had once joined, to distinguish between the conquering and the conquered;
this battle proving far greater than any before it, any at least between
Hellenes, for the number of vessels engaged. After the Corinthians had
chased the Corcyraeans to the land, they turned to the wrecks and their
dead, most of whom they succeeded in getting hold of and conveying to Sybota,
the rendezvous of the land forces furnished by their barbarian allies.
Sybota, it must be known, is a desert harbour of Thesprotis. This task
over, they mustered anew, and sailed against the Corcyraeans, who on their
part advanced to meet them with all their ships that were fit for service
and remaining to them, accompanied by the Athenian vessels, fearing that
they might attempt a landing in their territory. It was by this time getting
late, and the paean had been sung for the attack, when the Corinthians
suddenly began to back water. They had observed twenty Athenian ships sailing
up, which had been sent out afterwards to reinforce the ten vessels by
the Athenians, who feared, as it turned out justly, the defeat of the Corcyraeans
and the inability of their handful of ships to protect them. These ships
were thus seen by the Corinthians first. They suspected that they were
from Athens, and that those which they saw were not all, but that there
were more behind; they accordingly began to retire. The Corcyraeans meanwhile
had not sighted them, as they were advancing from a point which they could
not so well see, and were wondering why the Corinthians were backing water,
when some caught sight of them, and cried out that there were ships in
sight ahead. Upon this they also retired; for it was now getting dark,
and the retreat of the Corinthians had suspended hostilities. Thus they
parted from each other, and the battle ceased with night. The Corcyraeans
were in their camp at Leukimme, when these twenty ships from Athens, under
the command of Glaucon, the son of Leagrus, and Andocides, son of Leogoras,
bore on through the corpses and the wrecks, and sailed up to the camp,
not long after they were sighted. It was now night, and the Corcyraeans
feared that they might be hostile vessels; but they soon knew them, and
the ships came to anchor.
The next day the thirty Athenian vessels put out to sea, accompanied
by all the Corcyraean ships that were seaworthy, and sailed to the harbour
at Sybota, where the Corinthians lay, to see if they would engage. The
Corinthians put out from the land and formed a line in the open sea, but
beyond this made no further movement, having no intention of assuming the
offensive. For they saw reinforcements arrived fresh from Athens, and themselves
confronted by numerous difficulties, such as the necessity of guarding
the prisoners whom they had on board and the want of all means of refitting
their ships in a desert place. What they were thinking more about was how
their voyage home was to be effected; they feared that the Athenians might
consider that the treaty was dissolved by the collision which had occurred,
and forbid their departure.
Accordingly they resolved to put some men on board a boat, and
send them without a herald's wand to the Athenians, as an experiment. Having
done so, they spoke as follows: "You do wrong, Athenians, to begin war
and break the treaty. Engaged in chastising our enemies, we find you placing
yourselves in our path in arms against us. Now if your intentions are to
prevent us sailing to Corcyra, or anywhere else that we may wish, and if
you are for breaking the treaty, first take us that are here and treat
us as enemies." Such was what they said, and all the Corcyraean armament
that were within hearing immediately called out to take them and kill them.
But the Athenians answered as follows: "Neither are we beginning war, Peloponnesians,
nor are we breaking the treaty; but these Corcyraeans are our allies, and
we are come to help them. So if you want to sail anywhere else, we place
no obstacle in your way; but if you are going to sail against Corcyra,
or any of her possessions, we shall do our best to stop
you."
Receiving this answer from the Athenians, the Corinthians commenced
preparations for their voyage home, and set up a trophy in Sybota, on the
continent; while the Corcyraeans took up the wrecks and dead that had been
carried out to them by the current, and by a wind which rose in the night
and scattered them in all directions, and set up their trophy in Sybota,
on the island, as victors. The reasons each side had for claiming the victory
were these. The Corinthians had been victorious in the sea-fight until
night; and having thus been enabled to carry off most wrecks and dead,
they were in possession of no fewer than a thousand prisoners of war, and
had sunk close upon seventy vessels. The Corcyraeans had destroyed about
thirty ships, and after the arrival of the Athenians had taken up the wrecks
and dead on their side; they had besides seen the Corinthians retire before
them, backing water on sight of the Athenian vessels, and upon the arrival
of the Athenians refuse to sail out against them from Sybota. Thus both
sides claimed the victory.
The Corinthians on the voyage home took Anactorium, which stands
at the mouth of the Ambracian gulf. The place was taken by treachery, being
common ground to the Corcyraeans and Corinthians. After establishing Corinthian
settlers there, they retired home. Eight hundred of the Corcyraeans were
slaves; these they sold; two hundred and fifty they retained in captivity,
and treated with great attention, in the hope that they might bring over
their country to Corinth on their return; most of them being, as it happened,
men of very high position in Corcyra. In this way Corcyra maintained her
political existence in the war with Corinth, and the Athenian vessels left
the island. This was the first cause of the war that Corinth had against
the Athenians, viz., that they had fought against them with the Corcyraeans
in time of treaty.
Almost immediately after this, fresh differences arose between
the Athenians and Peloponnesians, and contributed their share to the war.
Corinth was forming schemes for retaliation, and Athens suspected her hostility.
The Potidaeans, who inhabit the isthmus of Pallene, being a Corinthian
colony, but tributary allies of Athens, were ordered to raze the wall looking
towards Pallene, to give hostages, to dismiss the Corinthian magistrates,
and in future not to receive the persons sent from Corinth annually to
succeed them. It was feared that they might be persuaded by Perdiccas and
the Corinthians to revolt, and might draw the rest of the allies in the
direction of Thrace to revolt with them. These precautions against the
Potidaeans were taken by the Athenians immediately after the battle at
Corcyra. Not only was Corinth at length openly hostile, but Perdiccas,
son of Alexander, king of the Macedonians, had from an old friend and ally
been made an enemy. He had been made an enemy by the Athenians entering
into alliance with his brother Philip and Derdas, who were in league against
him. In his alarm he had sent to Lacedaemon to try and involve the Athenians
in a war with the Peloponnesians, and was endeavouring to win over Corinth
in order to bring about the revolt of Potidaea. He also made overtures
to the Chalcidians in the direction of Thrace, and to the Bottiaeans, to
persuade them to join in the revolt; for he thought that if these places
on the border could be made his allies, it would be easier to carry on
the war with their co-operation. Alive to all this, and wishing to anticipate
the revolt of the cities, the Athenians acted as follows. They were just
then sending off thirty ships and a thousand heavy infantry for his country
under the command of Archestratus, son of Lycomedes, with four colleagues.
They instructed the captains to take hostages of the Potidaeans, to raze
the wall, and to be on their guard against the revolt of the neighbouring
cities.
Meanwhile the Potidaeans sent envoys to Athens on the chance of
persuading them to take no new steps in their matters; they also went to
Lacedaemon with the Corinthians to secure support in case of need. Failing
after prolonged negotiation to obtain anything satisfactory from the Athenians;
being unable, for all they could say, to prevent the vessels that were
destined for Macedonia from also sailing against them; and receiving from
the Lacedaemonian government a promise to invade Attica, if the Athenians
should attack Potidaea, the Potidaeans, thus favoured by the moment, at
last entered into league with the Chalcidians and Bottiaeans, and revolted.
And Perdiccas induced the Chalcidians to abandon and demolish their towns
on the seaboard and, settling inland at Olynthus, to make that one city
a strong place: meanwhile to those who followed his advice he gave a part
of his territory in Mygdonia round Lake Bolbe as a place of abode while
the war against the Athenians should last. They accordingly demolished
their towns, removed inland and prepared for war. The thirty ships of the
Athenians, arriving before the Thracian places, found Potidaea and the
rest in revolt. Their commanders, considering it to be quite impossible
with their present force to carry on war with Perdiccas and with the confederate
towns as well turned to Macedonia, their original destination, and, having
established themselves there, carried on war in co-operation with Philip,
and the brothers of Derdas, who had invaded the country from the
interior.
Meanwhile the Corinthians, with Potidaea in revolt and the Athenian
ships on the coast of Macedonia, alarmed for the safety of the place and
thinking its danger theirs, sent volunteers from Corinth, and mercenaries
from the rest of Peloponnese, to the number of sixteen hundred heavy infantry
in all, and four hundred light troops. Aristeus, son of Adimantus, who
was always a steady friend to the Potidaeans, took command of the expedition,
and it was principally for love of him that most of the men from Corinth
volunteered. They arrived in Thrace forty days after the revolt of
Potidaea.
The Athenians also immediately received the news of the revolt
of the cities. On being informed that Aristeus and his reinforcements were
on their way, they sent two thousand heavy infantry of their own citizens
and forty ships against the places in revolt, under the command of Callias,
son of Calliades, and four colleagues. They arrived in Macedonia first,
and found the force of a thousand men that had been first sent out, just
become masters of Therme and besieging Pydna. Accordingly they also joined
in the investment, and besieged Pydna for a while. Subsequently they came
to terms and concluded a forced alliance with Perdiccas, hastened by the
calls of Potidaea and by the arrival of Aristeus at that place. They withdrew
from Macedonia, going to Beroea and thence to Strepsa, and, after a futile
attempt on the latter place, they pursued by land their march to Potidaea
with three thousand heavy infantry of their own citizens, besides a number
of their allies, and six hundred Macedonian horsemen, the followers of
Philip and Pausanias. With these sailed seventy ships along the coast.
Advancing by short marches, on the third day they arrived at Gigonus, where
they encamped.
Meanwhile the Potidaeans and the Peloponnesians with Aristeus were
encamped on the side looking towards Olynthus on the isthmus, in expectation
of the Athenians, and had established their market outside the city. The
allies had chosen Aristeus general of all the infantry; while the command
of the cavalry was given to Perdiccas, who had at once left the alliance
of the Athenians and gone back to that of the Potidaeans, having deputed
Iolaus as his general: The plan of Aristeus was to keep his own force on
the isthmus, and await the attack of the Athenians; leaving the Chalcidians
and the allies outside the isthmus, and the two hundred cavalry from Perdiccas
in Olynthus to act upon the Athenian rear, on the occasion of their advancing
against him; and thus to place the enemy between two fires. While Callias
the Athenian general and his colleagues dispatched the Macedonian horse
and a few of the allies to Olynthus, to prevent any movement being made
from that quarter, the Athenians themselves broke up their camp and marched
against P
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